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FOSTER PARENTS VERSUS AGENCIES: A CASE
STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF
"THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHIELD"
DOCTRINE
Sanford N. Katz*
T is generally conceded that, in the area of child welfare, social
service agencies have the expert knowledge and methods for
making enlightened custodial dispositions. Consequently, courts rely
on agency decisions and have come to utilize agencies as the inter-
mediate placement for a child whose custody must be resolved.
Child welfare agencies are given the authority to choose the custo-
dian for a child on a temporary, permanent, or indefinite basis, and
may, at times, be authorized to supervise the placement of the child.
In a certain sense, the court is surrendering its jurisdiction by its
reliance on the welfare agencies, and this delegation of decision-
making power may have far-reaching consequences. Whether wel-
fare agencies use their power as wisely as courts assume depends
largely on what we mean by "wisely" and on what agency is in-
volved. In general, courts unfortunately have neither the time nor
the facilities to supervise agency placements, and it is only when an
individual has been rejected as a qualified custodian that courts have
an opportunity to review agency practices.
A recurring problem which courts face is the need to resolve the
conflict which arises when foster parents challenge the decision of
agencies that have disqualified these persons from continuing their
relationship with or adopting their foster child. This article will
explore the role of courts in resolving these disputes and will sug-
gest some criteria by which the courts may be guided in deciding
such questions.
I. THE CASE OF LAURA
A. Agency Participation
The history of Laura, the five-and-a-half-year-old child whose
custody was at issue in the New York case of In the matter of Jewish
Child Care Association,' is similar to that of many other children
* Professor of Law, University of Florida. This article is adapted from a paper
delivered at the American Orthopsychiatric Association Annual Meeting in San Fran-
cisco on April 13, 1966. The author is grateful to the Ford Foundation for supporting
the research upon which this article is based.-Ed.
1. 5 N.Y.2d 222, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65, 156 N.E.2d 700 (1959).
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who are similarly involved in the struggle of foster parents to adopt
children over the objections of placement agencies. When Laura
was 13 months old, she was placed by the Jewish Child Care Asso-
ciation, a foster care agency, with Mr. and Mrs. Sanders, a childless
couple in their thirties. Laura's mother, eighteen years old and
unwed, had been unable to care for the baby at birth and had placed
her with the New York City Department of Welfare, which trans-
ferred the child's custody to the Jewish Child Care Association
(hereinafter referred to as the Agency).
At placement, the Sanders were required to sign a document in
which mutual promises were exchanged.2 Among other things, the
couple promised to accept Laura as a member of their family and,
as foster parents, to give her affection and care. They promised to
follow the Agency's regulations regarding the boarding arrange-
ment, notification of and care during the child's illnesses, and
changes in living conditions that would affect the child, such as
2. The following is an example of the kind of agreement entered into by the
Agency and the Sanders:
In consideration of being accepted as foster parents by the Jewish Child Care
Association [hereinafter referred to as the Agency], we agree as follows:
1. The child placed with us will be accepted by us as a member of our family,
and will receive our affection and care as foster parents. The Agency will furnish
a monthly board payment, payable at the end of each month. At the time of
placement, we will be notified of the specific rate for the child placed with us.
The Agency will provide for the child's clothing, medical and dental expenses.
We will be reimbursed for certain other expenditures made, as described in
the Foster Parents' Manual, provided they have been previously authorized by
the Agency.
2. We will notify the Agency of any change or plans for change in our own
life, which may affect the child placed with us. This will include, but is not
limited to, vacation plans, illnesses, job changes, moving, and any change in the
composition of our family.
3. We will notify the Agency immediately if the child placed with us becomes
ill, and we will comply with the Agency's arrangements for medical and dental
care.
4. We are aware that the Agency has the responsibility for making plans with
regard to the child's relationship with his or her own relatives. We will cooperate
with the arrangements made by the Agency worker for visits between the child
and his or her own relatives.
5. We acknowledge that we are accepting the child placed with us for an in-
determinate period, depending on the needs of the child and his family situation.
We are aware that the legal responsibility for the foster child remains with the
Agency, and we will accept and comply with any plans the Agency makes for
the child. This includes the right to determine when and how the child leaves
us, and we agree to cooperate with arrangements made toward that end.
6. Should we find ourselves unable to continue giving foster care to the child
placed with us, we will notify the Agency promptly, and will cooperate with the
Agency in making the change of placement as easy as possible. For this reason,
we will give the Agency as much time to make such change as is needed, unless
our situation is emergent.
Date
Signature of Foster Mother
Signature of Foster Father
Countersigned:
Agency Social Worker
GoLDsrErN & J. KATz, TAE FAmuLY AND Tim LAw 1021-22 (1965).
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modifications caused by vacations, job changes, and other events.
They also agreed to cooperate with the Agency's plans for continu-
ing a relationship with the child's natural mother. Should the
couple be unable to continue as foster parents, they promised to
work with the Agency in making an orderly transition to another
placement. The Sanders acknowledged that they were accepting
Laura for an indeterminate period and were aware that the "legal
responsibility for the child" remained with the Agency.
During the first year after placement, the Sanders spoke with the
Agency about adopting Laura. They were told that adoption was
not possible and were asked to help the child understand who her
natural mother was. The child had seen her natural mother once
during the first year of placement. During the second year of foster
care, the Sanders again mentioned their desire to adopt Laura. The
Agency refused to consider the proposal and required the couple, as
a condition for keeping the child, to sign a statement acknowledging
that they had the child only on a foster home basis.8 Despite the
signed statement, the Sanders persisted in their efforts to adopt
Laura, unsuccessfully seeking approval from the child's natural
mother, grandmother, and other relatives. When the Sanders re-
3. The legal enforceability of a statement of this kind or of the child placement
agreement is open to question. In Adoption of McDonald, 43 Cal. 2d 447, 274 P.2d
860 (1954), foster parents signed an agreement with an adoption agency which in-
cluded, among other provisions, a requirement that any request for the adoption of
the child placed with them had to be approved by the agency, and a stipulation that
if after one year the agency was satisfied with the training of the child and the char-
acter of the foster parents' home, it would allow the adoption. The agreement further
provided that the agency had the right to remove the child previous to legal adoption
if at any time the circumstances warranted it. About eight months after the place-
ment of the child, the foster father committed suicide. Later the agency demanded
the return of the child. The foster mother refused to give up the child and petitioned
a court for adoption without securing the agency's consent. The trial court granted
the adoption, having concluded that the agency's consent was unnecessary.
One of the arguments which the agency made in its appeal to the California Su-
preme Court was that the foster mother was estopped from pursuing the adoption by
virtue of the agreement she and her husband signed at the time of placement. Ad-
dressing himself to this argument, Justice Traynor wrote:
The [State] department [of Social Welfare] . . . has no power by regulation or
otherwise to add to or detract from the rules for adoption prescribed in the Civil
Code .... Thus, neither appellant, the department, the county agency, nor any
private agency had the right by regulation or by agreement to deprive petitioner
of the rights granted her by section 226 of the Civil Code to petition the court
and have the court determine whether the petition should or should not be
granted. If the department could give a licensed agency the right to control the
adoption of a relinquished child, it could give such an agency the right to con-
trol the adoption of any child not subject to parental control. The statutory pro-
visions governing adoptions cannot be so circumvented.
In a proceeding such as this the child is the real party in interest and is not a
party to any agreement. It is the welfare of the child that controls, and any
agreement others may have made for its custody is made subject to the court's
independent judgment as to what is for the best interests of the child.
Id. at 461, 274 P.2d at 868; See also CAL. Crv. CODE § 224(n) (Supp. 1964).
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quested permission to take Laura with them on an out-of-state vaca-
tion, the Agency refused, asserting that the child should be returned
to her natural mother during that time. Laura, then four, had lived
with the Sanders for three years and had seen her natural mother
only twice. She was not to see her mother again until the litigation
over her custody began.
The Sanders' constant efforts to adopt Laura in contradiction of
their statements, along with the Agency's belief that the couple had
become too emotionally attached to the child, prompted the Agency
to demand Laura's return. The couple refused and the Agency
brought a writ of habeas corpus to demand the child's release from
the Sanders' home. As seen from the perspective of the foster
parents, the Agency's action was potentially beneficial for various
reasons. It allowed the Sanders to bypass administrative remedies
and to obtain an immediate judicial review of the Agency's decision
denying their adoptive suitability. Considering their strained rela-
tions with the Agency, the Sanders' chances for administrative
relief would probably have been slim. Furthermore, since a habeas
corpus proceeding is a method by which a court may explore the
child's welfare4 beyond the narrow issue of the legal right to cus-
tody,5 the fact that the Agency was the legal guardian of Laura did
not place it in a significantly advantageous position vis-4-vis the
Sanders.
B. The Trial
In the trial court proceedings to determine whether Laura's
"best interests" would be served by a custodial change, much of the
testimony was focused on the effect that the proposed change would
have on the child's natural mother as well as on the child's own
physical and emotional well-being. The line of questioning in which
the trial judge and the attorneys engaged seemed to be based on the
underlying assumption that the goal of the proceedings was to
determine how Laura's needs could best be secured in light of the
inability of the natural mother to raise the child.
The trial judge heard testimony from the foster parents, repre-
sentatives of the Agency, the Department of Welfare, and a psy-
4. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Berry v. Berry,
219 Ala. 403, 122 So. 615 (1929); Porter v. Chester, 208 Ga. 309, 66 S.E.2d 729 (1951);
Heuvel v. Heuvel, 254 Iowa 1391, 121 N.W.2d 216 (1963). Even the matter of child
support may be explored. See Howarth v. Northcott, 152 Conn. 460, 208 A.2d 540
(1965). Contra, Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 197 S.E. 426 (1938); Pugh v. Pugh,
133 W. Va. 501, 56 S.E.2d 901 (1949). But some jurisdictions limit the court's inquiry
on habeas corpus to the narrow issue of the legal right to custody. See, e.g., May v.
Anderson, $45 U.S. 528 (1953) (Ohio).
5. See New York Foundling Hosp. v. Gatti, 203 U.S. 429 (1906); Pukas v. Pukas,
129 W. Va. 765, 42 S.E.2d 11 (1947).
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chiatrist. The Agency acknowledged that the Sanders had taken
good care of the child and were providing her with a comfortable
home environment. However, it claimed that, because of the great
love of the foster parents for the child, Laura should be removed
from their custody and placed in a "neutral environment" where
foster parents would be called "aunt" and "uncle" instead of
"mother" and "father" and where "there would not be this terrible
pull on the child between her loyalty to her foster parents and her
mother." In other words, the Agency did not claim that the foster
parents were depriving the child of love, but rather argued that they
were indulging her with too much love. The effect of their indul-
gence on the child, the Agency urged, was a strain on her relation-
ship with her natural mother.
A large part of the trial consisted of the interrogation of a psy-
chiatrist called by the foster parents. In his testimony, he analyzed
the effect of a custodial change on Laura's emotional development.
In his opinion, the Sanders' love for the child had positive rather
than damaging emotional effects; indeed, Laura's removal from her
foster parents would be detrimental to her emotional growth. He
stated that latency was a critical period in a child's development and
that, at Laura's age, she needed the security of a sustained relation-
ship with her foster parents.
The trial judge apparently either was not sufficiently convinced
by the psychiatric testimony or was persuaded by the Agency's argu-
ment that the child was becoming too attached to her foster parents,
thus threatening her "relationship" with her natural mother. He
decided to remove Laura from her foster parents and to allow the
Agency to regain custody and place her in a "neutral environ-
ment." After the intermediate appellate court affirmed the decision
of the trial court,8 the Sanders appealed to the New York Court of
Appeals, which held in favor of the Agency in a split (4-3) opinion.9
6. 5 N.Y.2d 222, 227, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68, 156 N.E.2d 700, 702 (1959).
7. Jewish Child Care Ass'n v. Sanders, 9 Misc. 2d 402, 172 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Sup.
Ct. 1957), aff'd, 174 N.Y.S.2d 335 (App. Div. 1958), aff'd, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65, 156 N.E.2d
700, 704 (Ct. App. 1959).
8. Ibid. The basis of the New York Supreme Court's opinion was as follows:
Respondents have, the court feels, become fond of the child to an extent which
has resulted in an attempt by them to induce the mother to permit an adoption
by them; she has resisted these efforts and the conflict has resulted in this pro-
ceeding. The petitioner believes (quite correctly in the court's opinion) that it
cannot suffer its established practice to be set at naught solely because respon-
dents believe they can contribute more to the child's welfare than petitioner and
the mother can.
The court does not believe that the best interest of this child will be served
by the condonation of a disregard of their own obligations and agreements by
the respondents, however well-intentioned they may be.
Id. at 403, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
9. 5 N.Y.2d 222, 153 N.Y.S.2d 65, 156 N.E.2d 700 (1959).
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C. The Appeal
In the New York Court of Appeals' report, there is a discernible
and major shift in emphasis from that found in the lower court's
opinion. The trial court viewed "the best interests of the child"
doctrine in terms of securing Laura's health needs in light of her
natural mother's condition. The New York Court of Appeals first
concentrated on the legal status of the claimants and then inter-
preted "the best interests of the child" in terms of the continuity of
family loyalty and the law.
To the majority of the Court of Appeals, the fact that the
Sanders were Laura's foster, rather than natural or future adoptive,
parents was crucial. The court perceived foster parenthood as some-
thing less than full parenthood. By showing "extreme love," "affec-
tion" and "possessiveness" and by acting more like natural than like
foster parents, the Sanders, in the court's estimation, had gone
beyond the limits of their role as set out in the placement agree-
ment. In essence, what the majority took as conclusive in the case,
namely the "vital fact ... that Mr. and Mrs. Sanders are not, and
presumably will never be, Laura's parents by adoption,"'1 was the
very issue the court was to decide.
The court stressed its concern for preserving the natural ties
between Laura and her mother. "In considering what is in Laura's
best interests," the court wrote, "it was not only proper, but neces-
sary.., to consider the facts in terms of their significance to Laura's
eventual return to her own mother."" And later the court stated:
What is essentially at stake here is the parental custodial right. Al-
though Child Care has the present legal right to custody . . . it
stands, as against the Sanders, in a representative capacity as the
protector of Laura's mother's inchoate custodial right and the
parent-child relationship which is to become complete in the
future.12
Finally, in its concluding remarks, the court crystallized its main
preferences as follows:
[T]he more important considerations of the child's best interests,
the recognition and preservation of her mother's primary love and
custodial interest, and the future life of the mother and child to-
gether are paramount.'3
10. Id. at 229, 183 N.Y.S2d at 70, 156 N.E.2d at 703.
11. Id. at 228, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 69, 156 N.E.2d at 703.
12. Id. at 229, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 70, 156 N.E.2d at 703.
13. Id. at 230, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 71, 156 N.E.2d at 704.
[Vol. 65:145,
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1. Family Loyalty
The parental right to custody, the doctrine referred to by the
court as both "paramount" and "fundamental," holds that any bio-
logical parent is entitled to the custody of his child unless the parent
is affirmatively shown to be unfit.1 4 Many courts have claimed that
the right is based on principles of morality and natural affection.15
However, the common law history of the doctrine reveals that it
may have been created for considerations of wealth rather than the
dictates of a moral code. During the feudal period, custodial rights,
which had commercial value, were subject to transfer and sale; a
child was a financial asset to his father. During this early period,
therefore, a custodial right was a property right.16 In time, as concern
developed for the child's welfare and as the mother was legally con-
sidered a joint custodian together with the father, the emphasis
shifted from the property theory of custody toward the personal
status theory.' That is, the natural parents, because of their rela-
tionship to the child, were presumed to be the custodians best fitted
to serve the child's needs.
At first glance, the parental right to custody may seem to be a
doctrine competing with "the best interests of the child" approach.
Indeed, the parental right theory has been described as a secondary
doctrine in child custody matters. 18 Perhaps, however, it is more
appropriate to say that the parental right doctrine is often treated as
if it were an expression of "the best interests of the child." Most
frequently courts, invoking the parental right doctrine when they
prefer to award custody to the child's natural parents rather than
other claimants, assume that the disposition best serves the child's
14. See, e.g., Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 152 P.2d 999 (1944); McGuire v. Mc-
Guire, 190 Kan. 524, 376 P.2d 908 (1962); Stout v. Stout, 166 Kan. 459, 201 P.2d 637
(1949); Ex parte Barnes, 54 Ore. 548, 104 Pac. 296 (1909). See also IowA CODE § 633.559
(1963).
15. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 105 Cal. App. 2d 392, 233 P.2d 639 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1951); Acomb v. Billeiter, 175 So. 2d 25 (La. Ct. App. 1965); In the matter of
Lewis, 35 Misc. 2d 117, 230 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Surr. Ct. 1962); Anonymous v. Anonymous,
15 Misc. 2d 389, 181 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. 1959); People ex tel. Kropp v. Shepsky,
305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953).
16. See Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. Cm. L. Rv. 672, 676-77 (1942);
tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and
Present Status, Part II, 16 STAN. L. Rav. 900, 925 (1964).
17. For many purposes, however, the child is still treated as property; there has
been a shift, but not a substitution.
18. Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under Which a Child May Be Adopted
Without the Consent of His Parent, 39 U. DEr. LJ. 347, 354-60 (1962); Alternatives
to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE LJ.
151, 152-53 (1963).
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welfare.19 When custody is awarded to others, it is likely that courts
will simply state that "the best interests of the child" demand such a
disposition,20 or that "the superior rights" of parents, or the pre-
sumption in their favor, must yield to "the best interests of the
child." 21 It seems safe to say that when courts invoke the parental
right doctrine to award custody to the natural parents, they are
merely articulating an archaic notion, based upon a preference for
the continuity of blood ties or the preservation of kinship loyalty, in
order to justify a decision. It is a significant aspect of Child Care
that the majority was more concerned with the symbol of natural
family loyalty than its fact. As indicated previously, Laura's natural
mother had seen the child twice in four years, and Laura's loyalty to
her would seem, at best, to be more imaginary than ieal.
2. Integrity of the Law
In his final remark in his opinion for the Court of Appeals,
Chief Judge Conway came to grips with what appeared to be his
primary concern. While the interests of Laura and her natural
mother (but apparently not those of the foster parents) were of
significant importance, another factor was involved. The integrity
of the law, as manifested in the child placement contract and in the
administrative decisions of a private agency, had been challenged.
In order to maintain authority, these administrative policies had to
be affirmed and the child placement agreement enforced: "[T]he
program of agencies such as Child Care.. . may not be subverted
by foster parents who breach their trust."
22
The majority in Child Care was again concerned with symbols.
Judge Conway seemed compelled to preserve the sanctity of legal
doctrines and, indirectly, the reputation of a community institution.
The Sanders had been a threat both to the integrity and the stability
of the placement contract2 and to the prestige of the Agency. To
give Laura to her foster parents would have been to reward persons
who had failed to fulfill their promises and who had undermined
the Agency's decision. It seems that by protecting community in-
stitutions, the court shifted its focus from Laura's welfare to other
19. See, e.g., Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 152 P.2d 999 (1944); Stout v. Stout,
166 Kan. 459, 201 P.2d 637 (1949); Bond v. Bond, 167 So. 2d 388 (La. Ct. App. 1964);
Ex parte Barnes, 54 Ore. 548, 104 Pac. 296 (1909).
20. See, e.g., Kennedy v. State Dept. of Pensions & Security, 277 Ala. 5, 166 So. 2d
736 (1964); Forbes v. Haney, 204 Va. 712, 133 S.E.2d 533 (1963).
21. See, e.g., Bond v. Bond, 167 So. 2d 388 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Mouton v. St.
Romain, 245 La. 839, 161 So. 2d 737 (1964).
22. 5 N.Y.2d 222, 230, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65, 71, 156 N.E.2d 700, 704 (1959).
23. But see note 3 supra.
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matters: the continuity of legal doctrine and the prestige of a social
service agency.
Child custody proceedings, more than other litigation, may be
merely a cover for the real conflicts: a power struggle between indi-
viduals, institutions, or individuals and institutions, which culmi-
nates in a decision that indicates a preference for certain social
values over others. It is sometimes said that, in child custody dis-
putes between divorced parents, the child may act as a tool of the
parents and the court as an arena in which the parents can display
their mutual hostilities. In Child Care, one was not witnessing an
intra-family conflict, but rather a struggle between community insti-
tutions: welfare agency and foster family. The important question
before the court was not necessarily who should be awarded custody
of Laura, although this inevitably was resolved, but whose decision-
making power was to be recognized, the welfare agency's or the
foster parents'. In Child Care, the Agency prevailed, and the deci-
sion therefore may be described as one which furthered the best
interests of the Agency. Whether it was in the best interests of the
child is hard to say. The psychiatrist and a dissenting judge thought
it was not.
24
II. TOWARD CLARIFYING "THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD"
Assuming that the preservation of biological ties, the mainte-
nance of the sanctity of contract law, and the protection of the
prestige of a social service agency were the basis for the court's deci-
sion in Child Care, the question remains: were these considerations
relevant to determining the custodial disposition that would further
Laura's best interests? This question is difficult to answer unless one
first defines for oneself "the best interests of the child," for the doc-
trine has no absolute definition. Nor is there uniformity in the
results of the cases in which the doctrine has been applied. In
general, all that can be said is that, as the doctrines of "bona fide
purchaser" in the law of real property and "good faith" in nego-
tiable instruments, so "the best interests of the child doctrine" is a
mandate from the legislature, directing the judge to use his discre-
24. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Froessel anticipated the ultimate result of the
case, multiple placements for Laura. He wrote:
If Laura is to be bandied about meanwhile from family to family until she is
transferred to her mother, each such change will be extremely difficult for the
child, as testified to without contradiction by the psychiatrist at the hearing. Why
multiply the shocks? And if the mother never chooses to take Laura, and that
does not appear to be unlikely from the record before us, the child could not
find a better home than she now enjoys.
5 N.Y.2d at 235, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 75, 156 N.E.2d at 707.
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tion in making a disposition.25 Obviously, such an interpretation of
the doctrine permits what has, in fact, taken place in Child Care:
the use of value preferences dominant in the community and re-
flected in important community institutions.
Perhaps a reason for the constantly shifting bases of child cus-
tody opinions relating to establishing and reorganizing the parent-
child relationship 20 is that courts feel there are few legal tests to
which these decisions can be subjected. This conclusion may be un-
sound. Legal prescriptions existing in other areas, such as the stan-
dards relating to supervising the parent-child relationship, might be
useful as guides. In this section, an effort will be made to formulate
criteria for deciding custodial disputes and to provide a framework
that might be helpful in narrowing and disciplining a court's scope
of inquiry during both the information gathering and the evaluat-
ing stages of the decision. Furthermore, the proposed analytical
scheme might provide judges a means by which they can express
their preferences.
A. Purpose of the Parent-Child Relationship
Our cultural preferences may cause one to assume that a child is
best reared in a family setting. The task in child placement is to find
a family that will fulfill a child's needs. One way of determining
these needs is to try to identify what the community expects the
family, particularly parents, whether natural, adoptive, or foster, to
provide for a child. Or, we may try to identify the goals of the
parent-child relationship, regardless of what kind of parent is in-
volved.27 Answers are provided in reported cases, statutes, and pre-
25. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 46-24 (1958) (the court can "make any order
which it deems reasonable'); ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1956) (the court shall make
a custodial disposition "as shall appear reasonable and proper"); MINN. STAT. § 518.17
(1947) (the court shall make a custodial disposition "as it deems just and proper");
NEB. REv. STAT. § 42.311 (1960 Rev.) (the court shall make a custodial disposition "as
it shall deem just and proper'). See also Foster & Freed, Child Custody, Part I, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 423, 438 (1964).
26. The terms establishment and reorganization of the parent-child relationship
refer to the substantive and procedural requisites for becoming a natural, adoptive,
foster, neglected, and emancipated parent or child. The term "supervision" refers to
governmental administration of established and reorganized parent-child relation-
ships. This terminology is developed in GOLDSTEIN & J. KATz, op. cit. supra note 2, at
1-5 (1965).
27. In much of the legal literature, a distinction, perhaps artificial and distracting,
is made between foster care (giving rise to the foster parent-child relationship) and
adoption. Foster care is regarded as temporary and adoption is considered permanent.
See, e.g., Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rep. 707 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1961); Estate of McCardle, 95 Colo. 250, 35 P.2d 850 (1934); Schneider v.
Schneider, 25 N.J. Misc. 180, 52 A.2d 564 (Ch. 1947); Griego v. Hogan, 71 N.M. 280,
377 P.2d 953 (1963); Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Wash. 510, 364 P.2d 444 (1961). This dis-
tinction can be interpreted in a number of ways. For example, it may relate to the
duration of the status. Or, it might be suggestive of the legal implications that flow
[Vol. 65:145
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vailing middle class mores about parental responsibilities, but the
discussion below will be restricted primarily to cases involving the
state's supervision of the parent-child relationship. The pattern that
emerges from these cases suggests a concern for promoting (1) order,
integrity and family loyalty; (2) financial security; (3) health and
education; and (4) morality and respect.
1. Order, Integrity and Family Loyalty
At birth a child is considered to be in the custody of his natural
parents. Some have looked upon the family relationship that is
established at this time as a trust which parents hold for the benefit
of their child and the state.28 In reality, however, due to the sheer
necessities of the circumstances, parents assume control over and
have immediate supervision of their infant to the exclusion of
others. Except for certain compulsory governmental health measures
during the first few weeks of their child's life, such as the silver
nitrate treatment at birth and perhaps the PKU (phenylketonuria)
test later, natural parents have the power to make decisions affecting
their child's life.29
from either status: foster care gives rise to ambiguous relationships while adoption
creates fixed legal relationships similar to and sometimes identical with those between
parents and their natural children. The following discussion may raise doubts about
these assumptions. Also, it may lead one to question whether Mr. and Mrs. Sanders'
status as foster parents should have been "the vital fact" for decision.
Foster parent refers to the status that arises when one not related, by either direct
parental blood or through formal legal proceedings officially establishing an adoptive
parent-child relationship, assumes the role generally regarded in the community as
the one held by a parent. In traditional legal terminology, he would be one who
stands in loco parentis. This doctrine, an illustration of a legal fiction, holds that
people who act as if they were natural parents are legally held to the same standards
as parents. To determine the status, courts tend to apply agency law notions, namely
whether the parent "held himself out to the world" as a parent. For a full discussion
and history of the doctrine, see Schneider v. Schneider, supra.
Foster status may arise in numerous ways, for instance, through direct or indirect
formal judicial authority, by a formal or informal arrangement, or by voluntarily
caring for a foundling. It also includes parents of a child placed in their custody
prior to a final adoption decree and parents who hold themselves out as adoptive
parents believing in the validity of an adoptive decree which is legally defective.
Further illustrations include the situation that arises when a court awards guardian-
ship and custody to persons other than the natural parents, or when a court awards
a social welfare agency guardianship and custody of a child with the power to dele-
gate (usually through an agreement that has the appearance of a legal contract) the
parental role to persons chosen by the agency. This is what occurred in Laura's case.
A not infrequent situation that may give rise to the foster. parent-child relationship
is that in which one accepts into his home and treats as his own a child surrendered
by his parents. This may occur by a formal or informal agreement or through aban-
donment. On the other hand, one is an adoptive parent only at the culmination of
valid legal adoption proceedings.
28. See, e.g., Gardner v. Hall, 132 N.J. Eq. 64, 26 A.2d 799 (Ch. 1942); Lippincott
v. Lippincott, 97 N.J. Eq. 517, 128 Ad. 254 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925); Elliot v. Elliot, 235
N.C. 153, 69 S.E.2d 224 (1952).
29. Many states have statutory provisions regulating the silver nitrate test. See,
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In legal terminology, a parent's control over and supervision of
his child is called the "parental right to custody," and, if it can be
included in the bundle of rights associated with marriage, establish-
ing a home and rearing children, it can be claimed as a right that is
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental," 30 and, therefore, constitutionally protected.
The United States Supreme Court has employed substantive due
process to protect the family, especially the husband-wife and par-
ent-child relationships, from unwarranted governmental intrusion.
This principle of protecting the freedom of the family is supported
by cases beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska,31 in which the Court
held invalid a state statute prohibiting the teaching of the German
language to children who had not passed the eighth grade, and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,32 in which the Court ruled unconstitu-
tional a law preventing the operation of private schools. Meyer and
Pierce were considered to involve fundamental rights protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The principle that there is a realm of family life which the state
cannot invade, save for some compelling reason such as protecting
children from imminent danger, was reinforced by Prince v. Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts.33 In that case, the United States Su-
preme Court held that Massachusetts child labor laws were not un-
reasonable restrictions on either a parent's right to rear children,
especially with regard to teaching and practicing a particular faith,
or a child's right to observe that faith. For the purpose of illustra-
ting the extent to which the Court believes the parent-child relation-
ship should be secure and free from unreasonable interference from
the state, Mr. Justice Rutledge's words are relevant:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hinder .... And it is in recognition of this that these decisions
[Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyer v. Nebraska] have respected
the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public
interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. . . .Acting to
guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 19.92 (1958); FLA. STAT. § 383.05 (1965); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 91, § 108- (1963). Minnesota specifically waives the test if parents object to it.
MINN. STAT. § 144.12(8) (1965 Supp.). New York has enacted a statutory provision re-
quiring the administering of the PKU test. See N.Y. PuB. HArTH LAW § 2500-a.
30. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
31. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
32. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
33. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in
many other ways. . . . The catalogue need not be lengthened.
It is sufficient to show . . that the state has a wide range of
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affect-
ing the child's welfare; and that this includes, to some extent,
matters of conscience and religious conviction. 34
Although it was the privacy of the husband-wife relationship that
had been invaded by the State of Connecticut's restriction on the
use of birth control devices in Griswold v. Connecticut,5 that case
has ramifications for the parent-child relationship. In Griswold, Mr.
Justice Douglas extracted from the Bill of Rights a penumbral
right of marital and familial privacy. Mr. Justice Goldberg's inter-
pretation of the ninth amendment gave additional support to pre-
cedent affirming the goal of integrity and security in the family.
The significance of his remarks about the husband-wife relationship
for that of the parent-child should be apparent.
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that
clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights
to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar
order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected.
Although the Constitution does not speak in so many words
of the right of privacy in marriage, I cannot believe that it offers
these fundamental rights no protection. The fact that no par-
ticular provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State
from disrupting the traditional relation of the family-a relation
as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization-surely does
not show that the Government was meant to have the power to do
so. Rather, as the Ninth Amendment expressly recognizes, there
are fundamental personal rights such as this one, which are pro-
tected from abridgment by the Government though not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution.36
That the parent-child relationship should be secure, stable,
orderly and free from unreasonable interference by the state or
others is further emphasized in cases which establish the right of a
parent to procedural due process and other procedural advantages
when the custody of his child is being litigated. The due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires a court to notify a
natural parent and to give him an opportunity to participate in a
proceeding designed to determine his child's custody. Some courts
have analogized parents' rights in their children to "property rights"
34. Id. at 166-67.
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Id. at 495-96 (concurring opinion). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-
52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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within the protection of the due process clause;37 others have main-
tained that these rights are protected by the guarantee of liberty.
38
In addition to procedural due process, there is a procedural pref-
erence given to natural parents in that the burden of proving a
natural parent's unfitness is placed on the individual who desires to
gain custody of a child over the natural parent's objection."9 The
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Armstrong v.
Manzo40 illustrates the extent to which the Court will go to protect
a natural parent's right to his child. In that case, the issue was
whether an adoption decree was valid when secured by the child's
natural mother and her second husband without notification to the
first husband, the child's natural father. Although the natural father
had subsequently obtained a hearing on his motion to vacate the
decree because of the lack of notice and had presented evidence at
that hearing in an attempt to establish the necessity of his consent to
the adoption, the Court held that the decree was invalid. The
failure of the adoption court to provide the natural father an oppor-
tunity to contest the adoption was more than a routine denial of
procedural due process, because the court's action permanently de-
prived "a legitimate parent of all that parenthood implies."141 The
natural father's absence in the adoption proceedings gave the adop-
tive applicant (second husband) an undue advantage since he did
not have to carry the burden of proving his own qualifications and
the natural father's unfitness. In the subsequent hearing on the
motion to vacate the decree, this crucial allocation of the burden of
proof was reversed, for the natural father, since he was the moving
party in that hearing, was required to demonstrate affirmatively his
fitness to have custody of the child. The Court, realizing the deci-
siveness of the location of the burden of proof, was unwilling to
deprive the natural father of his procedural preference in the adop-
tion proceeding.
Another, perhaps indirect, indication of a community policy
favoring the integrity of the parent-child relationship is that the
law discourages and may even prohibit the unconditional voluntary
termination of the parent-child relationship, regardless of the type
37. See, e.g., Brooks v. De witt, 178 S.W.2d 718 (rex. Civ. App. 1944).
38. See, e.g., Stubbs v. Hammon, 135 N.W.2d 540 (Iowa 1965).
39. Professor tenBroek convincingly demonstrates that the burden of proof in
favor of parental fitness applies mainly to members of the middle classes, but is sub-
stantially relaxed as to the poor. In cases involving the poor, "parental fitness" is
examined rather than presumed. tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law:
Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, Part 11i, 17 STAN. L. Rav. 614, 676
(1965).
40. 380 U.S. 45 (1965).
41. Id. at 550.
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of parental status. Criminal sanctions attach to parents who fail to
fulfill the incidents of the right to custody: companionship, financial
support and health care.42 It is doubtful whether any state permits
the voluntary legal termination of the parent-child relationship
unless there is a satisfactory placement available for the child or
unless there is reason to believe that denying the termination peti-
tion will be detrimental to the child's welfare.43 Thus, natural
parents probably would not be allowed to terminate the full range
of their duties, whether the child be healthy or handicapped, in the
absence of a showing that the action would serve the child's
welfare.44
In the adoptive parent-child relationship, the goal of order and
integrity is also maintained. Once the adoptive status is legally
established, the adoptive parent's duty and right to control and
supervise his adopted child, even to the exclusion of the child's
natural family, is preserved in the same way as the custodial right of
the natural parent.4 5 Courts are reluctant to set aside an adoption
decree, or to terminate or annul an adoption. Some courts have
taken the position that, absent express statutory authority clearly
establishing grounds sufficient for terminating the adoption, adop-
tive parents cannot be relieved of their parental obligations. 46 Juris-
dictions having statutory provisions allowing termination or annul-
ment in certain circumstances, such as a child's misconduct, his
physical or mental illness unknown at the time of adoption, or
when the best interests of the child demand termination, tend to
apply these provisions narrowly.47 Thus, adoptive parents may not
divest themselves of their custodial duties merely because they are
dissatisfied with their child, regret their decision about adoption, or
42. These are usually found in child neglect statutes. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
11.35.010 (1962); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-801 (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-2-1
(1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-815 (1956); M. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 88(b) (1957);
MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 273, § 1 (1957 Supp. 1965); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.99(B)
(1963); Wis. STAT. § 947.15 (1961).
43. The Model Adoption Act drafted by the U.S. Department of Health, Educa-
tion, & Welfare provides for the voluntary termination of parental rights regardless
of the availability of satisfactory placement. See CwnLaRFN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE GUIDES FOR THE TERMINATION OF PA-
RENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILTIES AND THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 12-13 (1961).
44. This parallels the law of assignment: one may assign one's rights, but not
one's duties (delegation of duties leaves one responsible unless there is a novation).
45. See Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 177 P.2d 628 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
46. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 214 Ore. 664, 330 P.2d 151 (1958).
47. See, e.g., Buttrey v. West, 212 Ala. 321, 102 So. 456 (1924); Pelt v. Tunks, 153
Colo. 215, 385 P.2d 261 (1963); Mulligaw v. Wingard, 72 Ga. App. 539, 34 S.E.2d 305
(Ct. App. 1945) trans. from 198 Ga. 816, 33 S.E.2d 269; Succession of Williams, 224
La. 871, 71 So. 2d 229 (1954); In re Pierro, 173 Misc. 123, 17 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Surr. Ct."
1940).
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think they made a bad deal.48 This is true even if the adoptive
child's natural parents wish to resume a legal relationship with
him.49 Adoption is said to create "a for better, for worse situation," 50
and is therefore seemingly more protected than the marriage of the
adoptive parents, which may be dissolved by divorce.
It is said that the parental right to custody does not attach to
foster parents unless specifically decreed by a court; in other words,
foster parents seem to have more duties than rights. This statement,
however, may be misleading, for foster parents may in fact enjoy the
right to custody without benefit of the label. A de facto custodial
interest develops in a foster parent when the foster relationship con-
tinues over a length of time. Courts are reluctant to interfere with
this interest and, if they do interfere, the foster parent is generally
entitled to notification and an opportunity to appear and defend his
interest.51 A continuing foster relationship, if secure and orderly, is
typically protected even against a natural parent's unreasonable in-
trusion.52 If a natural parent wishes to interfere with the foster
parent relationship, he must, as any other individual, carry the
burden of proving the foster parent's unfitness, as well as the burden
of showing that the child's needs will be served best by another
custodial arrangement.5 3
Under certain conditions, a foster parent may terminate his re-
lationship with his foster child. The most important of these condi-
tions is that the foster parent must intentionally perform a positive
act-which ordinarily implies obtaining the consent of all parties in
interest-severing all aspects of the relationship. 4 Announcing a
decision to terminate the relationship while continuing to live with
the child is insufficient. 55 A foster parent may not choose to honor
his right to enjoy companionship and fail in his duty to support. 56
48. See, e.g., Parsons v. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147 (1898); In re Adoption
of L (Essex County Ct., P. Div.) 56 NJ. Super. 46, 151 A.2d 435 (1959).
49. See In re Adoption of L., supra note 48.
50. In re Adoption of a Minor, 214 N.E.2d 281 (Mass. 1966).
51. See In re Adoption of Cheney, 244 Iowa 1180, 59 N.W.2d 685 (1953).
52. See Cummins v. Bird, 230 Ky. 296, 19 S.W.2d 959 (1929).
53. See State v. Knight, 135 So. 2d 126 (La. App. 1961).
54. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. W. Va. 1952); Leyerly v.
United States, 162 F.2d 79 (10th Cir. 1947); Young v. Hipple, 273 Pa. 439, 117 Ad. 185
(1922).
55. See Capek v. Kropik, 129 Ill. 509, 21 N.E. 836 (1889); Schneider v. Schneider,
25 N.J. Misc. 180, 52 A.2d 564 (Ch. 1947).
56. That there is a duty to support under these circumstances is evident from
public welfare law. The "man-in-the-house" rule, or, as it is sometimes called, the
"substitute parent" policy, was stated in People v. Shirley, 55 Cal. 2d 521, 524, 360
P.2d 33, 34 (1961):
[U]nder regulations of the State Board of Social Welfare a stepfather living in
the home is responsible for the support of the mother of a needy child unless
incapacitated and unable to support .... A man living in the home assuming
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Presumably, therefore, the policy discussed above of protecting and
sanctioning an established and subsisting relationship is not appli-
cable when a foster parent decides to terminate that relationship.
The context in which questions are raised about the foster parent's
power to terminate the foster parent-child relationship is usually a
stepfather's refusal to continue to support his non-adopted stepchild
after he has divorced the child's natural mother. Courts normally
reason that the order which was present in the relationship has been
disrupted by the divorce and that no purpose would be served by
requiring the continuance of the duty to support, correlative to the
right to custody, in the absence of a sustained relationship. New
York, however, goes further than most jurisdictions in requiring a
step-parent, after divorce or death of the spouse, to support the
spouse's child if his failure to provide such support would place an
economic burden on the state.57
2. Financial Security
The statutory obligation which both natural and adoptive
parents have to support their children probably rests more on the
policy of preventing children from becoming economic burdens on
the state than on any other notion.5 8 The level of financial security
the role of spouse has the same responsibility as that of a stepfather for the
mother and the needy children. ....
An illustration of state welfare regulations pertaining to the "substitute parent"
policy is found in Part III, Section V of the Georgia Manual of Public Welfare
Administration, dealing with the eligibility conditions for the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children Program (AFDC). Subdivision (5) of Section V(3) disqualifies
needy dependent children from the program if they are found to have a "substitute
father." The subdivision states:
(5) Substitute Father: A man living in common-law relationship with a woman is
considered a substitute father of any child had by that woman, or any child that
woman has had by another man. Further, a man living in common-law rela-
tionship with a woman is responsible for the support and care of his and her
children, regardless of whether or not he is married to another woman. Regu-
lations place the same responsibility on this man as if he were the legal husband.
The rules for establishing deprivation are the same as those used in establishing
it in a legal-father situation.
GEORGIA STATE DEP'T OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERviCES, Div. OF SOCIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION, MANUAL OF PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATION 7 (1964). See also Pacht, Support
of Dependents in the District of Columbia: Part I, 9 How. L.J. 20, 36-38 (1963); ten-
Broek, supra note 39.
57. Department of Welfare v. Siebel, 6 N.Y.2d 536, 190 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1959), ap-
peal dismissed, 361 U.S. 535 (1960), construing N.Y. CITY DOM. REL. CT. ACT § 101(5).
In 1962 the New York Domestic Relations Act was repealed. Section 101(5) was
reenacted in N.Y. FAMILY CT. AC § 415 (1963). See also tenBroek, supra note 39.
This is just one illustration of the "Dual System of Family Law." The New York rule
establishes a different law for step-parents of poor children than applies to those step-
parents in more comfortable positions. The reason may well be the fiscal consideration
of saving tax money.
58. See Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N.W. 295 (1890); Crain v. Mallone, 130
Ky. 125, 113 S.W.2d 67 (1908); Holland v. Beard, 59 Miss. 161, 42 Am. Rep. 360 (1881);
State v. Thornton, 232 Mo. 298, 134 S.W. 519 (1911); Geary v. Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167
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demanded of parents is one that would enable a child to be housed,
fed, clothed, educated, and given medical care in a manner which
satisfies minimum but acceptable community standards. Providing a
child with bare subsistence is insufficient. Also, since support duties
are a public responsibility to which both criminal and civil sanc-
tions attach, these duties cannot be avoided except in extraordinary
circumstances, such as destitution; 59 merely renouncing or improp-
erly delegating the duty is without force.60 When natural or adop-
tive parents make no provisions for support, those who do provide
for the child may seek restitution from the parents.61
The fact that a person has only a foster relationship with his
child will ordinarily not relieve him of his support duty. Courts and
statutes, enforcing a foster parent's support duty, speak of the doc-
trine of in loco parentis and in effect state that persons acting like
natural parents assume support duties as if they were natural
parents.62 Foster parents, therefore, may also be required to reim-
burse those who undertake to support their children.63 The support
responsibilities of foster parents may be imposed by contract. In a
formal child placement, in which the agency contracts with foster
parents to provide a child with care and daily necessities, it can be
said that the agency transfers its duty of support to the foster
parents, although the agency probably continues to have subsidiary
liability. Foster parents would be subject to civil liability if they
failed to fulfill their obligations.
N.W. 778 (1918); Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939). See also Jones,
The Problem of Family Support: Criminal Sanctions for the Enforcement of Support,
38 N.C.L. RaV. 1, 13 (1959); Pacht, supra note 56, at 21.
59. See, e.g., Watts v. Steele, 19 Ala. 656, 54 Am. Dec. 207 (1851); In re Estate of
Weisskopfs, 39 Ill. App. 2d 380, 188 N.E.2d 726 (1963); Fruen v. Fruen, 228 Minn.
391, 37 N.W.2d 417 (1949); Libby v. Arnold, 161 N.Y.S.2d 798 (N.Y. City Dom. Rel. Ct.
1957).
60. See, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 93 Kan. 114, 143 Pac. 410 (1914); Huffman v.
Hatcher, 178 Ky. 8, 198 S.W. 236 (1917); State v. Bell, 184 N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190
(1922).
61. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kirk, 212 Ky. 646, 279 S.W. 1091 (1926); Greenman
v. Gillerman's Estate, 188 Mich. 74, 154 N.W. 82 (1915); Worthington v. Worthington,
212 Mo. App. 216, 253 S.W. 443 (1923). See also Jones, supra note 58, at 12, 13.
62. In re Harris, 16 Ariz. 1, 140 Pac. 825 (1914); Howard v. Randolph, 134 Ga. 691,
68 S.E. 586 (1910); Faber v. Industrial Comm., 352 Ill. 115, 185 N.E. 255 (1933);
Foreman v. Henry, 87 Okla. 272, 210 Pac. 1026 (1922); Rosky v. Schmitz, 110 Wash. 547,
188 Pac. 493 (1920); Ellis v. Cary, 74 Wis. 176, 42 N.W. 252 (1889). See also In re Adop-
tion of Cheney, 244 Iowa 1180, 59 N.W.2d 685 (1953); Brummitt v. Corn, 357 S.W.2d 37
(Ky. Ct. App. 1962); Britt v. Allred, 199 Miss. 786, 25 So. 2d 711 (1946); Austin v.
Austin, 147 Neb. 109, 22 N.W.2d 560 (1946); Hollis v. Thomas, 42 Tenn. App. 407, 303
S.W.2d 751 (1957); State ex rel. Gilroy v. Superior Court, 37 Wash. 2d 926, 226 P.2d
882 (1951).
63. See Rudd v. Fineberg's Trustee, 277 Ky. 505, 126 S.W.2d 1102 (1959).
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8. Health and Education
Natural and adoptive parents have a duty to establish an affec-
tionate relationship with their children and to nurture and protect
their physical and emotional well-being. Also, they are expected to
provide their children with guidance and to offer them the oppor-
tunity for educational development. Courts use the in loco parentis
doctrine to impose these same responsibilities on foster parents.
One context in which courts are asked to enforce health respon-
sibilities is where a parent has failed to provide his child with the
necessities of health care. For instance, the parent, natural, adoptive
or foster, may be required to compensate a physician who has pro-
vided professional services for a child without the knowledge of the
parent.6 4 A more immediate expression of a community policy pro-
tecting children's health is found in instances of child neglect. The
state may spell out the scope of parental responsibilities by estab-
lishing health standards65 when a child is in immediate danger of
death because of parental failure to consent to a surgical operation
or blood transfusion, or when a child has been starved or mistreated,
to mention only a few extreme examples. This prescription of
health standards is indicative of what the state will not tolerate:
parents who severely deprive their children of physical safety, emo-
tional security, or comfort. Discovery of violations of these standards
may lead to criminal prosecution, temporary or permanent loss of
custody, or state supervision of custody.
Just as there is no clear statement of what constitutes the maxi-
mum or ideal of good health, neither is there any judicial or statu-
tory expression of the extent to which parents must enlighten their
children. 6 The educational duty which rests on the parents begins
with the birth of the child, and the duty is essentially, although not
entirely, uncontrolled. There is almost no state supervision of the
duty to educate until a child reaches five or six, although govern-
64. See, e.g., Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953).
65. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 39 Ga. App. 100, 146 S.E. 333 (1929); People ex rel.
Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952);
Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 139
N.W. 676 (1913); In re Carstairs, 115 N.Y.S.2d 314 (N.Y. City Doam. Rel. Ct. 1952);
People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
66. A recent Ohio case held that parents have a duty to educate their children in
areas grossly neglected in the schools, such as sex education. The court reversed the
conviction of a mother for contributing to the delinquency of her minor daughter by
instructing her in the use of birth preventive measures, ruling that the conviction
violated the mother's constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. See State v.
McLaughlin, 4 Ohio App. 2d 327, 212 N.E.2d 635 (1965).
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mental control could be assumed prior to those ages if the child
were "neglected" by not having received rudimentary education.
When their children reach the age of five or six, parents are ex-
pected to enroll them in educational institutions under state regula-
tion, to refrain from interfering with school attendance, and, in fact,
to encourage their children's attendance until they reach a specific
age (usually sixteen). State compulsory education acts contain crim-
inal sanctions which apply to parents who fail to fulfill their
responsibilities. Whether parents must provide their children with
educational opportunities beyond statutory compulsory education
is an open question, depending perhaps on the economic and social
situation of the parents. Recent trends in appellate case law suggest
that parents may in fact be required to support their children in
college.67
4. Morality and Respect
Closely associated with the parental duty to nurture health and
education is the parent's responsibility to teach his child respect and
to provide him with a moral environment in which he may develop
sound character. This responsibility imposes on a parent, whether
natural, adoptive or foster, an obligation to train his child in differ-
entiating "right" from "wrong," and to develop his child's con-
science. It also requires a parent to teach by example, that is, to
conduct himself in a manner that his child may emulate. Further-
more, although this duty is rarely articulated, the parent is expected
to instill in his child respect for the parent as an individual and an
authority figure, and, as the child matures, to implant in him respect
for other persons and authorities in society. To assist in the develop-
ment of respect for authority, courts give parents wide latitude in
the exercise of their disciplinary powers. An underlying reason for
this latitude is the thought that one way in which children learn to
67. Courts are presently split as to whether a college education is a necessity for
which the father must provide. One Ohio court has held that a college education is
not included among the "necessaries" which a parent is "legally required" to furnish
a child. Ford v. Ford, 109 Ohio App. 495, 167 N.E.2d 787 (1959). But another Ohio
court, in the same year, held that whether a college education is a necessary is a
relative matter and "considering the progress of society and our nation's need for
citizens educated in the humanities and sciences, a college education is a necessary
where the minor's ability and prospects justify it." Calogeras v. Calogeras, 163 N.E.2d
713, 720 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1960). It has been stated that the most important factors in
determining a father's liability for the expenses of a child's education are the father's
ability to pay and the child's capacity for further education. Pincus v. Pincus, 197
A.2d 854 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 210 A.2d 549 (D.C. Ct. App.
1965). See also Commonwealth v. Rice, 206 Pa. Super. 393, 213 A.2d 179 (1965); O'Brien
v. Springer, 202 Misc. 210, 107 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Commonwealth v. Decker,
204 Pa. Super. 156, 203 A.2d 343 (1964).
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adjust to the mandates of society is through the proper use of
discipline.
The moral conduct expected of parents is rarely defined in terms
of specific religious dogma since, as individuals, parents are not
required to follow the dictates of a particular religion, although the
tenets of the dominant Judeo-Ghristian culture may influence the
standards of parental conduct. The moral conduct necessary to fulfill
parental responsibilities usually encompasses notions of "common
decency, cleanliness of mind and body, honesty, truthfulness, and
proper respect for established ideals and institutions." 68 A parent is
free to choose the method by which his child will be inculcated
with a sense of morality, and he need not utilize religious training
for this purpose. In fact, courts have consistently stated that parents
have no duty to give their children any religious training. Parents
are, therefore, as free to ignore religion in their home as they are to
rear their children in a particular faith.69
B. Relevance of the Goals of the Parent-Child Relationship
to Child Custody Disputes
It is interesting to observe the reluctance of courts to set any-
thing but minimum and often only vague standards when enforcing
parental duties. Yet when courts are faced with the problem of es-
tablishing a new parent-child relationship, they seem to feel that the
factors which are decisive in that context are radically different from
those relevant in the administration of an existing relationship.
Thus, in invoking "the best interests of the child" doctrine when
choosing a custodian, courts might ignore the community expecta-
tions of parenthood which have been discussed above and make a
disposition entirely inconsistent with our notions of parental respon.
sibilities.
Examples of the courts' lack of specificity in enforcing parental
duties are found in cases involving a child's financial security,
where courts rarely say anything more than that the child must be
provided with a decent standard of living, whatever that may be. It
is also unclear whether the standard of the child's education should
68. See L v. N, 326 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Mo. 1959).
69. Courts have generally stated that it is outside the province of the law to regu-
late religious activities in the home. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963); Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956); Wojnarowicz
v. Wojnarowicz, 48 N.J. Super. 349, 137 A.2d 618 (Ch. 1958); Paolella v. Phillips, 27
N.Y. Misc. 763, 209 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1960); People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271
N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936); Hackett v. Hackett, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 485, 150 N.E.2d 431
(Ct. App. 1958).
November 1966]
Michigan Law Review
be set at a minimum level or at the highest potentialities of the
child.70 Questions about the extent of parental responsibilities are
unanswered in other areas. For instance, what are the standards for
furthering a child's physical and emotional well-being beyond re-
quiring a parent to protect his child from immediate dangers? Must
the parent take positive steps to ensure optimum good health?
Should the standard for physical health be set at seeking high ath-
letic attainment? As to the emotional health of the child, should the
standard be the ability to be stimulated, to form positive relation-
ships with others, or to participate effectively in group activities?
Does a parent's responsibility to further a child's respect for others
include promoting equal respect for persons of all races and reli-
gions and in all levels of the social strata? The lack of answers to
these questions may be attributable to the courts' failure to consider
them seriously.
Courts tend to be more specific when faced with questions of
morality and religion, but their decisions are most frequently
phrased in negative terms. In order to teach a child social responsi-
bility, special ethical training is not necessary, nor need the spiritual
aspects of life be encouraged by attending religious services.71 Or-
ganized religions are not necessarily preferred over other ethical
systems, including atheistic systems,72 and one religious faith is not
preferred over others,73 although there seems to be a certain reluc-
tance to favor individuals with unusual or unpopular views over
those who follow Judeo-Christian beliefs. These decisions best illus-
trate the dichotomy which may exist between the goals of parent-
hood and the application of "the best interests of the child" doc-
trine to the initial selection of custodians. Parents in an existing
relationship are permitted considerable discretion in the regulating
of their child's moral development. However, in custodial disposi-
tions, the courts may look to the religious, philosophical and polit-
ical qualifications of the applicants and construe "the best interests
of the child" so as to discriminate against persons adhering to
certain, perhaps unorthodox, ideologies.
In a recent and now celebrated Iowa case, Painter v. Bannister,7
Mr. Painter, the natural father of a seven-year-old boy, brought a
writ of habeas corpus against Mr. and Mrs. Bannister, the child's
maternal grandparents, to regain custody of the child. After the
70. See note 67 supra.
71. See, e.g., Welker v. Welker, 24 Wis. 2d 570, 129 N.W.2d 134 (1964).
72. See, e.g., Cory v. Cory, 70 Cal. App. 2d 563, 161 r.2d 385 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945).
73. See, e.g., Angel v. Angel, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 531, 2 Ohio Op. 2d 156, 140 N.E.2d
86 (C.P. 1956).
74. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. Week 8082 (U.S.
Sept. 3, 1966) (No. 518).
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child's natural mother had died in 1963, his father had arranged for
the grandparents to care for him in their home. A year later, the
father remarried and asked the grandparents to return the child.
They refused, and the father brought the present action. In 1965, the
trial court granted the writ and awarded Mr. Painter custody of his
son, but stayed execution of the judgment until the matter could
be determined on appeal. In February 1966, the Iowa Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the lower court, stating that the best
interests of the child would be promoted by allowing the grand-
parents to retain custody.
The factors which the Iowa Supreme Court viewed as material
in choosing the grandparents' home and way of life over the natural
father's make it apparent that in child custody cases courts clearly
move beyond the goals of parenthood discussed earlier. Because of
their discretionary powers, the courts may in fact frustrate these
goals. Note the Iowa court's language in describing and comparing
the characteristics of the Painters and the Bannisters:
We are not confronted with a situation where one of the con-
testing parties is not a fit or proper person. . . . As stated by the
psychiatrist who examined Mr. Painter at the request of Ban-
nisters' attorneys: "It is evident that there exists a large differ-
ence in ways of life and value systems between the Bannisters
and Mr. Painter, but in this case, there is no evidence that psychiat-
ric instability is involved. Rather, these divergent life patterns seem
to represent alternative normal adaptations."
It is not our prerogative to determine custody upon our choice
of one of two ways of life within normal and proper limits and
we will not do so. However, the philosophies are important as they
relate to Mark and his particular needs.
The Bannister home provides Mark with a stable, dependable,
conventional, middle-class, middlewest background and an oppor-
tunity for a college education and profession, if he desires it. It
provides a solid foundation and secure atmosphere. In the Painter
home, Mark would have more freedom of conduct and thought
with an opportunity to develop his individual talents. It would be
more exciting and challenging in many respects, but romantic,
impractical and unstable.
The house in which Mr. Painter and his present wife live . . .
"is a very old and beat up and lovely home . . . ." The large yard
on a hill in the business district . . . is of uncut weeds and wild
oats. The house "is not painted on the outside because I do not
want it painted."
Mr. Painter is either an agnostic or atheist and has no concern
for formal religious training. He has read a lot of Zen Buddhism
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and "has been very much influenced by it." Mrs. Painter is Roman
Catholic. They plan to send Mark to a Congregational Church
... on an irregular schedule. [The court also noted that Mr.
Painter is a political liberal.]
These matters are not related as a criticism of Mr. Painter's
conduct, way of life or sense of values. An individual is free to
choose his own values, within bounds, which are not exceeded
here. They do serve however to support our conclusion as to the
kind of life Mark would be exposed to in the Painter household.
We believe it would be unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian,
and probably intellectually stimulating.
Were the question simply which household would be the most
suitable in which to raise a child, we would have unhesitatingly
chosen the Bannister home. We believe security and stability in the
home are more important than intellectual stimulation in the
proper development of a child.75
These excerpts indicate that "the best interests of the child"
doctrine permits a court to camouflage its own values, provincial
community values, or the interests of dominant local institutions.
Absent guidelines, there is no method for evaluating the application
of the doctrine. Review, then, becomes as unpredictable as the deci-
sion of the trial court because an abuse of discretion cannot be
subjected to any discernible standards. Presently, appellate review of
child custody cases serves either to reaffirm the values previously ex-
pressed by the lower court or, more rarely, to substitute the pref-
erences of the appellate court for those of the lower court.
C. Summary
The main purpose of this discussion was to illustrate what one
might call the minimum goals of parenthood. These goals, found in
cases involving the supervision of the parent-child relationship, may
be helpful in determining factors relevant for the purpose of choos-
ing custodians. To summarize, the following appear to be the basic
goals of the parent-child relationship: to maintain an orderly, stable
and loyal relationship so that the government will not be required
to intervene in that relationship; to provide a financial base which
will enable a child to mature into a healthy adult and to acquire the
skills necessary to participate in and contribute to the economic
processes of society; to nurture the child's physical and emotional
safety, health and comfort; to provide a child with guidance and the
opportunity for educational development; to teach a child respect
75. Id. at 154, 155, 156.
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for his parents, other authorities and human beings; and to train a
child in social responsibilities.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The judicial role in child custody matters should be creative.
The court should conduct an inquiry, independent of the agency's,
to find the specific family unit best fitted for the child. This inquiry
necessitates studying closely the familial patterns actually estab-
lished. But this examination should not be exclusive. The court
should widen the scope of inquiry beyond the immediate claimants.
It should investigate alternative placements if it is not fully satisfied
either with the qualifications of the persons claiming custody or
with the immediate plans for the child. Further, courts should re-
quire concrete plans for a child rather than be forced into deciding
a custody case on the basis of agency assumptions which may be
unrealistic or influenced by factors that have no connection with the
welfare of the child. According to this concept of the information
gathering stage of the judicial process, the trial court's approach in
Child Care was not adequate. The court's failure to question
the Agency's assumptions and plans for the child was serious. If it
had directed a re-examination of the Agency's plans to place Laura
with "neutral parents," it might have discovered that "neutrality"
or a non-human environment is foreign to child placement policies76
In fact, a "neutral environment" could not have been found.
7 7
76. In commenting on the Child Care case, Miss Lydia Rapoport has written:
We do know nothing can flourish in a neutral environment, least of all a human
being. Whatever arguments and current re-evaluations there may be of the work
of Spitz and Bowlby, they have convincingly demonstrated that "neutrality" or a
non-human environment produces non-human beings and even physical atrophy.
We do know, with a fair degree of certainty, that the greatest damage to healthy
psychological development is instability-and the kinds of impediments that
interfere with the process of identity formation. We also know that long-term
separation (after the capacity for the development of object relationships-at
whatever age various experts may decide this is) causes damage. Perhaps one
cannot talk of permanent damage because of the maleability of the human
organism. However, I am convinced that the scarring process is permanent. All
this, the child care agencies know very well. It would be impossible for foster
parents to create a climate of neutrality and still carry out their parental obli-
gations and role. It struck me that the child care agency, for whatever reasons,
was confused regarding its central obligation: that of the well being of the child.
Rapoport, "Safeguarding the Child's Best Interests: A Discussion" (unpublished paper
presented at the American Orthopsychiatric Association Meeting in San Francisco on
April 13, 1966).
77. The ironic sequel to Child Care was that the "neutral environment" suggested
by the Agency was not the ultimate placement for Laura; she experienced multiple
placements (almost predicted by Judge Froessel in his dissenting opinion, see note 24
supra). Within two years after the New York Court of Appeals' decision was
rendered, Laura had been in two settings. The child was first placed with her natural
mother and then in her maternal grandmother's home. See GoLDSTEIN & J. KATz, THE
FAMILY AND ma LAw 1033-34 (1965).
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There should be some limitations, however, on the judicial role.
Abuse of judicial discretion, such as the arbitrary determination
found in Child Care, should be checked. It is suggested that the use
of judicial discretion be restricted by clarifying "the best interests of
the child" doctrine in terms of the specific community goals of the
parent-child relationship discussed above. That is, when choosing a
custodian for a child, the following questions should form the basis
for the court's investigation and decision:
(1) What disposition will provide the child with a stable,
orderly, and loyal parent-child relationship, thus lessening
the likelihood that the state will have to interfere with the
relationship in the future?
(2) What disposition will furnish the child with the economic
base necessary for him to become a useful and productive
member of society?
(3) What disposition will provide the child with an environ-
ment that will foster physical and emotional health?
(4) What disposition will furnish the child with an environ-
ment that will encourage educational goals?
(5) What disposition will provide the child with an environ-
ment that will promote equal respect for all human beings
and will give him an opportunity to mature into a morally
stable and responsible adult?
The purpose of framing "the best interests of the child" doctrine
in terms of these general questions is to direct the scope of inquiry
to particular operative factors serving community goals. Further-
more, the questions may furnish a checklist for organizing the
amorphous data that is produced in child custody disputes.
Once the scope of judicial inquiry is narrowed, the next task is
an evidentiary one. Courts should draw on the knowledge of various
disciplines. Information gathered from fields such as psychiatry,
psychology, sociology, social work, theology, and education may
demonstrate the extent to which certain characteristics of the child
and the claimants are important in achieving the objectives of the
parent-child relationship. The behavioral sciences also can aid in
answering perhaps more fundamental questions, namely, the effect
of parental personalities and behavior on a child, the extent to
which environment outside the family affects the child, and the im-
pact on the child of both his maturation and his socialization. The
result of such an approach will hopefully be that the child is the true
beneficiary of a custodial dispite, not the parents and not the
agencies.
